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Does Higher Inflation Lead to
More Uncertain Inflation?
A. Steven Holland
N recent years, many countries have experienced
“stagflation,” a period of high and rising inflation and
unemployment. Over this time, higher inflation in-
creasingly has come to be blamed for higher unem-
ployment and reduced growth of real output. This
contrasts sharply with previously held notions that
there was either a long-run tradeoffbetween inflation
and unemployment or a “natural rate of unemploy-
ment” regardless of the inflation rate.
One reason why many people have changed their
minds about inflation’s impact on the economyis the
presumed impact of”inflation uncertainty.”Many now
argue that there is greater uncertainty about future
prices during periods of higher inflation.1 This in-
creased uncertainty leads to a less efficient allocation
of resources.
The best-known statement of this view came from
Milton Friedman in his Nobel Lecture. Briefly stated,
Friedman argued that greater inflation uncertainty
shortens the average duration of contracts and re-
duces the efficiency of the price system. These two
forces combine to lower’ the growth rate of realoutput
and potentially increase the rate of unemployment.2
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‘Some have suggested that uncertainty begins to increase once the
rateof inflation rises abovesomethreshold. For example, see Logue
and Willett (1976) and Hater and Heyne-Hafer (1981).
2Friedman (1977). He suggests that thenatural rate hypothesis holds
for the very tong run (a period of decades), because the economy’s
institutional structure for dealing with inflation eventually will adjust to
eliminate the real effects of inflation.
Thus, ifreducing inflation produces sufficiently larger’
output growth and lower unemployment in the long
run, it is a worthwhile venture, even ifdoing sowould
produce a large short-term loss of output and rise in
unemployment.3 While Friedman’s discussion pri-
marily concerns the variability of inflation — not
necessarily identical to the notion of inflation uncer-
tainty — it is clear that he considers them to be closely
related.
This argument can be split into three separate
hypotheses: (1) higher inflation leads to greater
variability of inflation; (2) greater inflation variability
implies greateruncertainty about future inflation; and
(3 greaterinflation uncertainty has a detrimental effect
on economic activity. For’ policymakers to be con-
cerned about the relevance ofhypothesis 3, they must
believe that they can influence the level of inflation
uncertainty. Hypotheses I and 2 state that they can do
this by controlling the rate of inflation, If exogenous
factors, such as energy shocks, are primarily responsi-
ble for’greater inflation uncer’tainty,then policymakers
can do little to affect it.
This article focuses on the validity of the first two
hypotheses, which togetherimply that higher inflation
leads to greater inflation uncertainty. Besides analyz-
ing the causes ofinflation uncertainty, an assessment
of its potential effects is presented as well.
3To determine whether the long-term benefits ofanti-inflation policies
wouldoffset the short-term costs, one must consider thetiming ofthe
output effects and the rate at which future output gains are dis-
counted. See Meyer and Rasche (1980).
15FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1984
Since energy shocks have been the single most im-
portant factor accounting for temporary price level
changes, this article also investigates the impact of
changes in the relative price of energy on both the rate
ofinflation andthe levelofinflation uncertainty.4 Ener-
gyshocks and inflation uncertainty should be positive-
ly associated, because the magnitude and timing ofthe
effects ofan energy shock on the rate of inflation are
bound to be viewed with uncertainty.
WHAT IS INFLATION UNCERTAINTY?
tnflation uncertainty arises from a lack of complete
knowledge about how future price levels are deter-
mined. Of course, an individual typically will have
enough information to make some forecast of future
inflation rates. A given estimate of next period’s infla-
tion can be thought ofas themean ofsome underlying
probability distribution.
The forecaster’s inflation uncertainty may be esti-
mated by looking at the size of some specified confi-
dence interval for his forecast. For example, a person
may have predicted at the end of1982 that 1983 infla-
tion had a 90 percent probability of being between 3
percent and 5 percent. Ifthe same individual’s 90 per-
cent confidence interval for 1984 inflation (forecast at
the end of 1983) is wider, say 4 percent to 7 percent,
then his uncertainty about 1984 inflation is greater
than it was for 1983 inflation.
The analysis presented here deals with inflationun-
certainty for a representative individual. Though the
level of an individual’s uncertainty about inflation is
not directlyobservable, waysofestimating it havebeen
suggested in the literature. One of these is to use the
variance or standard deviation of the errors made in
forecasting inflation. A forecaster is trying to predict
theoutcome ofaprocess that has both systematic and
random components. With an unbiased forecast ofthe
irlflation rate, the variance ofthe forecast errors indi-
cates the importance of the random component and
can be consider’ed an estimate of the level of inflation
uncertainty.5 An implicit assumption in this type of
analysis is that the variance need not be constant but
may vary over time.
4See Tatom (1981).
5it is the ex ante, not the ex post, variance of forecast errors that is
relevant. Estimates of the latter, however, are commonly used as
proxies for inflation uncertainty. See, for example, Klein (1978),
Engle (1983), and Pagan, Hat and Trivedi (1983).
WHY DOES INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
MAVFER?
The real effects of inflation uncertainty arise in part
becauseinflation expectations enterinto the contract-
ingprocess.Any contract that provides for’payment in
nominal rather than real terms incorporates an ex-
pectation off’uture inflation. Ifactual inflation ends up
higher than was expected when the contract was
made, a redistribution of wealth occurs: those making
the contracted nominal payments gain and those re-
ceiving them lose. If actual inflation is lower than was
expected, the opposite wealth redistribution occurs.
When there is greater inflation uncertainty, risk-
averse individuals will attempt toshorten the duration
of contracts to reduce the risk ofloss caused by devia-
tions of actual from expected inflation. More frequent
negotiation ofcontracts willdivert economic resources
to the contractingprocess from other, previouslymore
efficient uses.6
As the accompanying insert demonstrates, greater
inflation uncertaintyincreases the riskassociated with
bothsavingand investing, sinceboth require a contract
of some kind, Individuals faced with greater inflation
uncertainty may choose to reduce both their planned
savings and investment.The result is likely to be lower
long-term real economic growth.
Anotherpotential real effect ofinflation uncertainty
is reduced efficiency of the price system in allocating
resources. The basic idea is this;the more uncertain is
inflation, “the harder it becomes to extract the signal
about relative prices from the absolute prices.”7 Be-
cause individual prices adjust to unexpected inflation
at different rates due to the presence of long-term
contracts and the costs of adjusting prices, relative
prices may betemporarilydistorted.5 Theyalso maybe
incorrectly perceived, because information does not
flow smoothly across markets. As a result, economic
efficiency is reduced, producing lower output gro%vth
°Indexationof contracts can reduce(though not totally eliminate) the
risk associated with contracting, and one would expect indexation to
increase as inflation uncertainty increases, For a theoretical analysis
of indexation in this context, see Gray (1978). Klein finds evidence
that an increase in “long-term price uncertainty” leads to a reduction
in the average term to maturity of outstanding corporate debt.
7Friedman, p. 467. Again, Friedman’s discussion is in termsof infla-
tion variability; if this variability were anticipated, however, adjust-
ments could be made that reduceor eliminate this effect. His discus-
sion of this effect is based on the work of Hayek (1945) and Lucas
(1973) among others.
8See Bordo (1980) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977).
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and possibly higher unemployment than if all relative sion of relative price changes leads to a significant
prices were correctly perceived.0 reduction in realGNPand increased unemployment.10
The notion that greater inflation uncertainty leads to
reduced economic growth and higher unemployment
has been supported byempirical research. Mullineaux
finds some measures ofinflation uncertainty to havea
negative effect on the growth of industrial production
and a positive effecton unemployment; Leviand Makin
get similar results for employment growth. Further-
more, Blejerand I,iederman findthat increased disper-
°Carlton(1981) discusses in detail the impact of inflation uncertainty
on the organization of markets. He concludes that (p. 19):
in response to inflationary uncertainty, we expect to see fewercon-
tracts with tixed prices for long time-periods, fewer customized goods,
greater use of standardizedgoods sold in a liquid market, a move from
outside contracting otcustomized goods to internal production through
vertical integration, and a move from vertical integration to reliance on
standard quality goods sold in a liquid market where“themarket” price is
easyto observe, All of these changes are undesirable from an efficiency
standpoint.
WHY SHOULD HIGHER INFLATION
LEAD TO GREATER INFLATION
UNCERTAINTY?
The relationship between higher rates of inflation
and inflation uncertainty is based more on empirical
regularities than on theoretical rationale. Beginning
with Okunin 1971, several researchers have found that
there are significant positive correlations between
rates of inflation and the variability of inflation across
countries and across time fot- a given country. Others
105ee Mullineaux (1980), Levi and Makin (1980), and Blejer and
Leiderman (1980). Evans (1983) finds an unstable price level to
have a negative effect on real GNP growth, and Able (1980) finds a
negative impact of inflation variabitity on the rate of investment.
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have found a positive relationship between inflation
variability (or inflation itself) and proxies for inflation
uncertainty, thelatter including thedispersion ofinfla-
tion expectations across survey respondents and the
variance of estimated inflation forecast errors. The in-
serton pages 20 and 21 provides asummary offindings
from previous studies.
The theoretical rationale centers on the hypothesis
that a more inflationary economy produces greater’
uncertainty about the future direction of government
policy, causing greater uncertainty about future infla-
tion. Okun states that the application of fiscal and
monetary policies is apt to be less consistent (i.e.,pre-
dictable) during inflationary times because ofthe diffi-
culty in reducing inflation without causing unaccept-
ably high rates of unemployment and interest.1’ In a
similar vein, Friedman states that:
A burst ofinflation producesstrongpressure to coun-
ter it. Polity goes from one direction to the other, en-
couraging wide variation in the actual and anticipated
rate ofinflation.And,ofcourse, in suchanenvironment,
no one hassingle-valued anticipations. Everyone recog-
nizes that there is great uncertainty about what actual
inflation will turn out to be over any specific future
interval.’2
One can argue that an inflationary economy creates
an environment in which major policy changes be-
come more likely and the effects of such policy
changes become more uncertain. To support this
argument, one need only look at some of the policy
measures taken or proposed in recent years at least
partially in response to an inflationary economy: de-
regulation of financial institutions, wage and price
controls, indexation of income taxes and changes in
methods for implementing monetary policy.
INFLATION FORECASTS AND THE
VARIANCE OF ERRORS
The discussion above suggests that the variance of
errors in forecasting inflation could be used as one
measure of inflation uncertainty. Ifthe variance ofthe
forecast errors remains constant over time, so does the
level of inflation uncertainty. One way to determine
whether inflation uncertainty has changed over time is
to test for non-constant variance (i.e.)heteroscedastic-




‘3This is the approach suggested by Engle (1982) and Pagan, Hall
and Trivedi.
First, we need an inflation expectations model that
provides unbiased forecasts overboth lower’ and high-
er inflation periods; we can then testwhether the error
variance is larger for the higher inflation period. A
modelobtained byregressing the quarterlygrowth rate
ofthe GNPdeflator (~) on its own laggedvalues, lagged
values of the growth rate of Ml (Mi, and dummy vari-
ables fur periods ofwage-price controls and their after’-
math (Dl and D2)is given byequation 1in table j,t4 The
equation was estimated using data from 11/1954—ill!
‘4AIl growth rates are expressed in annualized log differences. Dl has
a unity value during the control period of 111/1971—I/i 973 and zero
otherwise. D2 represents the period during which controls were
being phased out, taking a unity value for the period I/I 973—I/I 975
and zero otherwise.





1983, and the number of lags was chosen using stan-
dard t and F tests. When we divide the sample into a
lower inflation period, ll/1954—1V/1967, and a higher
inflation per’iod, 1!1968—lll!l983, we can reject the
hypothesis that the errorvariance is the same inboth
periods.’5 As expected, the variance is higher in the
period of higher inflation.’4
Another test of the constancy of the variance of the
forecast errors overtime is obtained by regressing the
squared value ofthe inflationforecast error forperiod
(e~) estimated from equation 1 on thevariables thought
to cause changes in the variance. When four lagged
values of the inflation rate are used, the estimated
equationyieldstheresults shown in equationI in table
2. The results indicate, onceagain, that inflation affects
the variance of forecast errors using this model of ex-
‘5The average quarterly rate of growth of the GNP deflator between
lI/i 954 and IV/l 967 was 2.18 with a maximum of 4.57 and a mini-
mum of ‘-0.87; for 1/1968—Ill/i 983, the average growth rate of the
GNP deflator was 6.31 with a maximum of 11.41 and a minimum of
2.83. Thevalue of the calculated F-statistic (F53 ~ 1.77) from the
Goldfeld-Quandt test is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
For an explanation of this test for heteroscedasticity, see Goldfeld
and Quandt (1965).
leA Chow test does not indicate that the structure of the model is
different for the two periods. The Chow test statistic is F,0
99
0.705, far belowthelevel required for statistical significance atthe 5
percent level.
pected inflation.~’The effect overfour quarters is both
positive (as indicated by the sum of the coefficients of
thelaggedvalues ofthe inflation rate [0.209]) and statis-
tically significant at the 5 percent level.’8
Relative Energy Price Changes and
Expected Inflation
The above result seems to suggest rather strongly
that a higher inflation rate is associated with more
inflation uncertainty.This conclusion mustbe careful-
lyviewed,however-;theresults are quite sensitiveto the
way in which the model of inflation expectations is
specified. In particular, ifone considers the possibility
that individuals anticipate some impact of a higher
relative price of energy on the rate of inflation, then
inflation does not affect the variance of the errors. An
estimated inflation expectations model that incorpo-
rates two lagged values of the change in the relative
price of energy is presented in equation 2 of table a.’”
When the sample was divided into the same lower and
higher inflation periods as before (and the impact of
energy prices is taken into account), the hypothesis
that the error variance is the same in both periods
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of sig-
nificance.2°
Furthermore, as equation 2 in table 2 shows, lagged
values of the inflation rate do not affect the squared
inflation forecast error estimated from equation 2 in
table I.‘~‘ Therefore, when this inflation expectations
model is used, there is no indication that higherinfla-
tion is associated with greater inflation uncertainty.
“The test statistic TA2 (whereUsthe numberof observations) has a
x2 distribution with degreesoffreedom equal toT minus thenumber
of regressors. This statistic is used to test for heteroscedasticity. In
equation 1 in table 2, TA2
= 9.62, which is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. This test is suggested by Engle (1982).
‘8The f-statistic for the sum of the coefficients is 2.59. Additional
lagged values of~up to a total of 12 had no effect.Lagged values of
the rateof inflation are used instead of the current rate, because the
ratefor period t is not known at the time the forecast is made, This
procedureof regressing squaredresiduals on a setotvariables as a
test for heteroscedasticity is suggested by Breusch and Pagan
(1979).
‘l’he relative price ofenergy is defined as the ratio of the“fuels and
related products and power”component ofthe producerprice index
(PPI) to the business sector deflator, See Tatom for a slightly
different model of the inflation rate itself (rather than expected
inflation).
20The Goldfeld-Ouandt F-statistic is F5, ~ = 1.47.
21Neither the value of TA2 (4.72) nor the sum of the coefficients of
lagged inflation (0.112, t = 1.44) are statistically significant atthe 5
percent level.
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INDIVIDUAL INFLATION
UNCERTAINTY AND THE VARIABILITY
OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
AMONG INDIVIDUALS
Thepreceding tests illustrate one ofthe major prob-
lems involved in trying to estimate an individual’s
uncertainty about future inflation: estimates can be
sensitive to one’s assumptions about the nature ofthe
information used to forecast inflation. In this section,
we use a different approach to estimating inflation
uncertainty based on very different assumptions about
the way individuals form inflation expectations.
In contrast to the models of inflation expectations
estimated previously, individuals may use consider-
ably more information to forecast inflation rates than
the past growth rates of such aggregates as the price
level and money supp’y. For example, each forecaster
may have personal information regarding the histori-
cal relationship between the priceofaspecific product
and the general price level. This specialized informa-
tion is likely to be too costly forall individuals toobtain.
If thereis greater heterogeneity in the inflation signals
that forecasters receive from this type of market-
specific information, then greater dispersion of indi-
vidual inflation forecasts can result, An individual who
observes a wider variety ofpredictions ofnext period’s
inflation rate (through published sources, forexample)
may become more uncertain about the accuracy ofhis
own forecast, especially if he believes that dfflèrent
forecastsare based on information he does not have.22
22This kind of partial informationframework is used byCukierman and
Wachtel (1982). There is, however, an alternative explanation for
In the analysis to follow, it is assumed that greater
dispersion of inflation forecasts among individuals
leads to increased inflation uncertainty. Therefore, we
use measures based on the variability of responses to
the Livingston survey ofinflation expectations to fur-
therinvestigate the relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty.23
The standard deviation of the individual inflation
forecasts from the Livingston survey is the first proxy
forinflation uncertainty. Chart 1 shows the actual infla-
tion rate over the forecast period and the mean and
standard deviation of six-month inflation forecasts
from the first halfof 1954 to the first half of 1983. The
shaded areas of the chart represent periods of energy
shocks.24 The chart indicates that both energy shocks
increased variability of individual inflation forecasts: forecasters
may all use thesame information but in differentways. This would
not necessarily imply greater inflation uncertainty for a particular
individual since each forecaster could be just as certain as he ever
was about the accuracy of his forecast.
23Joseph Livingston of The Philadelphia Inquirer conducts a survey
each spring and fall, requesting respondentstoindicate theirpredic-
tions about a numberof economic indicatorsincludingthe consumer
price index (CPI). Because the survey results published, forexam-
ple, in June contain predictions for the following December, Living-
ston refers to them as six-month-ahead forecasts as does this
article. (The survey alsoincludes 12-month forecasts, which are not
used here.) Because the respondents to the June survey are
thought to know only the April CPI, however, they are actually
predicting an eight-month rate of change. For a detailed discussion
of the Livingstonexpectations data, see Carlson (1977). This article
uses the data in Carlson’s revised form updated to the present.
24The periods ofenergyshocks are the first halfof 1973 to the second
half of 1974, and the first half of 1979 to the first half of 1981. The
quarterly deflator for fuels and related products and power divided
by the business sector deflator grew at an annual rate of 22.9
percent from V/i 972 to V/i 974 and 23.4 percent from I/i 979 to
11/1981,
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Chart
Actual Inflation, Expected Inflation and Standard Deviation
of Six-Month Inflation Forecasts
P.rt..t Sem,annuat Data
and inflation may have a positive impact on inflation
uncertainty. All three series rose substantially during
periods of energy shocks, and there are significant
positive correlations between the uncertainty measure
and the other two series in other periods.25
The root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of the indi-
vidual forecasts of inflation from the survey serves as
the second proxy for inflation uncertainty. An ex-
amination of chart 1 indicates that the survey mean
inflation expectation is biased; it consistently under-
predicts the inflation rate over most of the sample
penod. The RMSE of the inflation forecasts incorpo-
25The correlation coefficient between the standard deviation and the
expected inflation rate is 0.787 for the entire period and 0.667 forthe
period omittingthetwo energy shock periods. Between the standard
deviation and the actual inflation rate, the correlations are 0.724 and
0.597, respectively. These figures are all statistically significant at
the 5 percent level,
rates these errors. The squared value ofthis variable is
the sum ofthevarianceofinflation expectations across
sun’e respondents (the standard deviation squared)
and the squared forecast error using the survey mean
as the expected inflation rate 20 The use ofthis variable
20The mean-squared error of the forecasts can be written:
MSE, = fA~ — ~O2
i=i
= pJ2
* ~ l±i ~ - V)2
where n is the number of forecasters, ~t’ is the expected rate of
inflation for the ith forecaster, and ~* isthemean expected inflation
rateamong the forecasters, The first term on the right-hand side of
the equation is the squared forecast error, and the second is the
variance of individual inflation expectations. We use the square root
of this variable and the standard deviation of expectations because
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shaded areas represent periods of energy price shocks,
t.atest data plotted- First hoff t983
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Chart 2
Actual Inflation, Expected Inflation
of Six-Month Inflation Forecasts
and Root-Mean-Squared Error
-2
1954 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
Shaded areas represent periods of energy price shacks,
Latest dora plotted, First half 983
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 11 12 13 74 15
as a measure of inflation uncertainty assumes that
there is greater inflation uncertainty, holding constant
the variance of inflation expectations, when a large
mean forecast error occurs than when a small mean
forecast error is observed,27
Chart 2 plots the B.MSE along with the actual infla-
tion rate and themean expected inflation rate from the
survey. Again there is a positive association between
the uncertainty measure and theothertwo series,with
the largestincreasesin RMSE occuning during periods
of energy shocks.28 As chart 2 shows) the RMSE is
27The standard deviation of the forecasts ‘has one advantage over
RMSE as a proxy for inflation uncertainty: it does not contain anyex
post information. RMSE~~I includes the actual inflation rate from
period t+1, ~
28The correlation coefficient between RMSE and the expected infla-
tion rate is 0.559 for the entire sample period and 0.433 for the
period exclusive of the periods of energy shocks. Between RMSE
and the actual rate ofinflation, the correlations are 0.826 and 0.658,
respectively.
considerably more variable than the standard devia-
tion over the sample period. The most interesting dif-
ference in the two series, however, is their behavior
during the energy shock periods: the standard devia-
tion remains higher than normal throughout each of
the energy shock periods and does not decline until
the period is over’;the RMSE peaks, then declines sub-
stantially while relative energy prices are still rising.
Therefore, these two measures imply different re-
sponses of inflation uncertainty to energy shocks.
INFLATION AND THE VARIABILITY
OF INFLATION FORECASTS
Thissection provides moredetailed evidence on the
effects ofinflation and energy shocks on the two mea-
sures ofinflation uncertainty discussed above. Table 3
presents results from regressions based on six-month
inflation forecasts. The data used are from the same
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In equation 1, the dependent variable is SD~,)I,,
which is the standard deviation of inflation expecta-
tions for’ period t+1as calculated from responses to
the Livingston survey at period t.29 The most recent
six-month rate ofinflation known to theforecasters, ~,
has a positive and strongly significant effect on the
standard deviation of the forecasts, Lagged values of
this variable had no significant effect. The value of the
29The variable is written SD,~ 1iI, to indicate that it is based on fore-
casts of period t+ 1 inflation given an information set from period t, It.
intercept implies that, in the absence of inflation or
changes in the relative price of energy, the standar’d
deviation of inflation forecasts would be about a 0.8
annualized percentage rate. The coefficient for ~ in-
dicates that for every 1 percentage-point increase in
the annual rate of inflation, the standard deviation
increases by about 0.1 percentage point. Therefore,
with 8 percent inflation, the standard deviation would
be twice as high as with zero inflation.
The three most recent values of the annualized six-
month change in the relative price of energy (~°( also
have a significant positive impact on this measure of
inflation uncertainty.30 A 1 percent increase in this
variable leads to an increase in the standard deviation
of 0.023 percentage points over’ three six-month
periods. In other words, an energy shock affects this
measure ofinflationuncertainty for up to 18months. A
20 percentage-point increase in the relative price of
energy — not uncommon in thelast decade — causes
the standard deviation of inflation expectations to in-
crease by about 0.45 percentage points.3’
Inflation’s Effect on the
Root-Mean-Squared Error of Forecasts
Equation 2 presents results using the B.MSE of infla-
tion forecasts for’ period t + 1 (BMSE2
+,( as the depen-
dent variable.32 The conclusion that inflation exerts a
positive influence on inflation uncertainty isthe same
as in equation 1, although the impact occurs over four
six-month periods. The sum of the coefficients ofcur-
rent and lagged inflation is positive arid significant.
Over24 months, a1 percentage-point increaseininfla-
tionleads to anincrease inRMSE ofabout 0.19 percent-
agepoints. Althoughthis is about twice the impact that
30The series forthe inflation rate and changes in the relative price of
energy are constructed to include themost recent numbers known
by the forecaster,somonthly data are used. Thespring forecaster is
assumed toknow the April levels of the CPI and the relative price of
energy, so the six-month rate of change is calculated between
October and April. For the fall forecast, the rate is calculated be-
tween April and October. The denominator in the relative energy
price variable for monthly data isthe finished goods component of
the PPI.
3tTheregressions alsowere run with a somewhatdifferentdependent
variable, the standard deviation across individuals of the expected
/evel of the CPI divided by the mean expected level, This is the
coefficient of variation of the CF’I level forecasts, The results were
similar to those for the standard deviation of the inflation rate fore-
casts. The coefficient of variation of the inflation rate forecasts is
clearly an inappropriate variable to use, since, as the expected
inflation rate approaches zero, the coefficient of variation
approaches infinity. ________
22RMSE~., = V(SOt~ i)I,)
2
+ (~ i~I,—
Inflation’s Effect on the Standard
Deviation of Forecasts
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inflation had on the standard deviation, the constant
term is nearly twice as high in this equation; thus, the
impacts actuallyare quite similar.The initialimpact of
inflation on RMSE is much greater than it is on the
standard deviation, but this effect is partially offset
after 24 months havepassed.
The impact of relative energy price changes is quite
different in this regression than it was in equation 1.
The initial impact on theuncertainty measure is posi-
tive, but the effect is totally offset 12 months later.33
Consequently, if the relative price of energy were to
increase by the same amount each period, it would
cease to haveany effect on the BMSE after 12 months.
In contrast, for the standard deviation of expectations
to stabilize, the level ratherthan thegrowth rate of the
relative price of energy must stabilize.34
In both equations, the effect of higher inflation on
the measure of inflation uncertainty is positive and
permanent. There is no indication that, over time, fore-
casters come to be just as certain about higher rates of
inflation as theywere about lower rates. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that higher inflation leads to
more uncertain inflation.
CONCLUSION
Researchers have compiled considerable evidence
suggesting that the rate and variability of inflation are
positively related and a lesser amount ofevidence link-
ingthese variables to inflation uncertainty. Thisarticle
hasexplored the relationship between therateofinfla-
tion and the level of inflation uncertainty in greater
detail, looking also at the impact of energy shocks on
inflation uncertainty.
The empirical results presented here are soniewhat
mixed and are sensitive to the method chosen for
measuring inflation uncertainty. On the one hand, a
model of inflation expectations was introduced and
estimatedforwhich thevariance oftheestimated infla-
tion forecast errors is related to the rate of inflation. A
~The inclusion of the variable ~+ in the regression is not meant to
imply that forecasters know the value of this variable, only that it
affects RMSE~,.
~Theregressions in table 3 alsowere run with several otherindepen-
dent variables, none of which was statistically significant at the 5
percent level, These included current and lagged values of the
absolute value of unanticipated inflation (based on the survey mean
expectation), a dummyvariable for the period of wage and price
controls, and a time trend. In regressions excluding the relative price
of energy, the estimated effects of inflation on the uncertainty mea-
sures were somewhat larger.
different inflation expectations model — one incorpo-
rating the effects of changes in the relative price of
energy on expected inflation — led to the opposite
conclusion. On the other hand, there are positive rela-
tionships between the rate of inflation and the stan-
dard deviation and root-mean-squared error of infla-
tion forecaststakenfrom the Livingstonsurvey. Energy
shocks also affect these two measures of inflation un-
certainty, but in quite different ways.
Becausethe results of empiricaltests based on infla-
tion forecasting models are sensitive to the specifica-
tion of the model, the usefulness of these results is
questionable. Therefore, uncertainty measures based
on the variability of ‘observed” inflation forecasts or
forecast errors should be given more attention. In this
article, these measures indicate that inflation uncer-
tainty canbe reduced ifthe rate ofinflation isreduced.
In light of recent evidence that greater inflation un-
certainty has a detrimental effect on the levels of eco-
nomic activity and unemployment, the reduction of
inflation uncertainty is an important potential benefit
of anti-inflation policies.
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